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Abstract—In this paper, we deal with backoff cheating tech-
nique in IEEE802.11 based MANETs and propose a novel scheme,
dubbed HsF-MAC (Hash Function based MAC protocol), to cope
with it. In contrast to the existing solutions, HsF-MAC allows
MANET nodes to re-calculate the backoff value used by their
1-hop neighbors and immediately detect the misbehaving ones.
Moreover, the colluding behavior of two cheating nodes is also
considered along with effective countermeasures. A reconciliation
based reaction mechanism is finally designed. The simulation
results, under different topologies and network conditions, have
validated the effectiveness of HsF-MAC.
Index Terms—MAC layer misbehavior, IEEE802.11, greedy
behavior, CSMA/CA, MANETs.
I. INTRODUCTION
MANETS potentially suffer from a range of vulnerabili-ties due to their special characteristics, such as shared
wireless medium, limited energy resources, rapidly changing
topology and untrustworthiness of the partners. These vulner-
abilities can be easily exploited by a misbehaving node to
launch a bunch of attacks at different layers, especially at MAC
layer where the manipulation of DCF parameters does not need
as much effort as the attacks launched at higher layers. A
misbehaving node disobeys the protocol rules to gain extra
bandwidth at the expense of the neighbor honest nodes. To
do so, it may use several cheating techniques, however this
paper’s focus is on backoff cheating technique in which the
misbehaving node sets its backoff to a small value rather than
calculating it following the Binary Exponential Backoff (BEB)
algorithm.
Since IEEE 802.11 [2] MAC protocol is commonly used by
wireless nodes to access the shared medium, any misbehavior
at this level alters the proper functioning of the network. In
the last decade, many researchers have focused their efforts
on investigating the root causes of MAC layer misbehavior,
such as the work done in [3]. Based on the findings of these
studies, various approaches have been proposed in the literature
to design a resistant MAC protocol that is able to either prevent
or detect any misuse at MAC level. These approaches can be
split into two main categories as follows. The first category of
solutions consists usually of a trustworthy central node (e.g.
WLAN Access Point or a Wireless Mesh Router) that monitors
the behavior of its neighbors during equal-length time intervals
and then uses several mechanisms (e.g. simple tests [5], fuzzy
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logic based tests [8] or statistical methods [6]) to analyze the
collected information and detect any misbehavior. In the second
category, the backoff algorithm is changed in most solutions in
order to make the backoff value predictable or give the receiver
node a control over it. For example, the backoff value to be
used by the sender node is assigned by its intended receiver
through a long negotiation process, like the work done in
[4], and the interval from which a sender randomly chooses
a backoff value is dynamically changed based on the previous
chosen value rather than the transmission status as in [7], which
leads to low channel utilization.
The major drawbacks of the previous approaches are that
they either require a large number of observation samples to
detect the cheaters or trigger a non-negligible number of false
alarms, which compromises their accuracy. Additionally, most
of these approaches do not provide a robust countermeasure
to cope with the collusive misbehavior1. To mitigate the above
weaknesses, we propose a proactive defense scheme, dubbed
HsF-MAC (Hash Function based MAC protocol), that takes
actions at earlier stage to efficiently deal with MAC layer
misbehavior launched by both single and colluding nodes.
Moreover, we propose a novel reaction scheme to penalize the
detected cheaters.
II. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
Coping with the greedy behavior at MAC layer in MANETs
remains as a grand challenge despite the numerous efforts. To
solve this problem, we have designed a novel scheme that aims
to achieve the following objectives: remove the assumption
of trustworthiness of one part of the communication, detect
the nodes which either maliciously choose a small backoff
value or refuse to double their CWs (Contention Window) after
collision, ensure fast detection of both single and colluding
cheaters (i.e. sender and receiver) with less number of false
alarms. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that an anti-
MAC spoofing mechanism is set up at MAC layer and that the
number of cheating nodes within a neighborhood is less than
the number of honest nodes.
In HsF-MAC, two new fields dubbed Attempt (Γ) and CRC
are added to each RTS frame as shown in Fig. 1. Γ represents
the number of times the sender has tried to transmit the RTS
frame and its corresponding data packet, whereas CRC is the
Cyclic Redundancy Code calculated over all the fields of the
data packet to be transmitted. The (Γ) value is initialized to 1
after a successful transmission and incremented by 1 for each
unsuccessful transmission of RTS or data packet. Using these
two parameters, the backoff value is computed according to
the following formula:
backoff = Hash(fct(CRC,Γ))mod 2Γ−1CWmin (1)
1A collusive misbehavior is driven by two misbehaving nodes (e.g. a sender
node and its corresponding receiver) that support each other to increase their
bandwidth at the expense of their neighbors.
2162-2337/12$31.00 c© 2012 IEEE
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
2 IEEE WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS LETTERS, ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION
Fig. 1. The new format of the RTS frame.
Fig. 2. Warn-single packet format.
where
fct(CRC,Γ) = (CRC ⊕ Γ) (2)
Here CWmin is the minimal contention window which
varies according to the technology used at physical layer (e.g.
CWmin = 31 for DSSS and 15 for OFDM). The CW value is
doubled after each collision. It is worth noting also that Hash
refers to any one way function like MD5 and SHA1.
By adopting this scheme the receiver can detect any devia-
tion from the sender since it is able to recalculate the backoff
value that has been chosen by this sender. This is feasible due
to the following features of HsF-MAC.
1) The CRC and Γ values used by the sender to compute
its backoff value are known to the receiver.
2) The purpose of using hash function to generate the
backoff value is to prevent any node from setting its
backoff to a small value since it is generated by one way
function (i.e. it is hard to find the inputs that produce a
specific small value).
3) Using the CRC field as an input to the fct function
may significantly reduce the number of collisions since
its value differs in each data packet.
4) We have added Γ as a second input to the fct function
in order to deal with retransmissions. In this case, CRC
is unchanged, while the new backoff value should be
different from the previous one because Γ increases with
the failure of retransmission attempts.
To summarize, HsF-MAC guarantees the randomness prop-
erty of the regular backoff scheme, thanks to the hash function,
and keeps the likelihood of repetitive collisions to minimal due
to the chosen inputs of the fct function.
In what follows, we describe in details how HsF-MAC
detects a single cheater? How this cheater is get penalized?
And how HsF-MAC deals with a collusive misbehavior of two
cheaters?
A. How a cheater node is detected?
On receiving an RTS frame, the receiver node extracts the
CRC and Γ values from this frame and uses them together
to re-calculate the backoff value used by the sender, following
the formula in Equation (1). If the number of elapsed idle
slots 2 (excluding the slots spent for other neighbor nodes’
transmissions) after the last transmission of the sender is less
than ((backoff + DIFS)-  ), this indicates that the sender
node has violated the protocol, thus it deserves an appropriate
punishment. We denote that , called accuracy factor, is used
to minimize the number of false alarms. These false alarms
2We consider only the number of the elapsed idle slots during which no
collision is observed.
Fig. 3. Warn-collusion packet format.
are generated as a result of the inaccuracy of all observations
taken by the receiver node regarding the backoff used by the
sender. This inaccuracy occurs, for example, when the receiver
node presumes that the sender has frozen its backoff timer due
to a transmission or interference from a third node whereas
actually this sender is counting down its backoff.
In case of consecutive collisions incurred by the collision of
either CTS or data frames, a cheater node may follow the back-
off computation scheme but intentionally keeps the Γ value
unchanged and consequently refuses to double its contention
window. This misbehavior can be easily detected by HsF-MAC
through a comparison of the CRC values corresponding to
respective RTS frames. That says, if these values are equal and
Γ is unchanged then the receiver node infers that the sender is
a cheater. For more sophisticated scenario where the cheater
alters also the CRC value to mislead the receiver node, a
simple comparison of the CRC value received in the RTS
frame with that calculated over the received data frame will
reveal the misbehavior of this cheater.
B. Our reaction scheme: warn or punishment?
In contrast to the existing reaction schemes in the literature,
our reaction mechanism gives a chance to the cheating node
to repent and abide again to the protocol rules, so as to avoid
being punished. We have chosen this mechanism because we
believe that it is better to incite a cheater node to behave
correctly rather than excluding it from the network. This is
because in MANETs, every node contributes significantly to
ensure the availability of network’s services such as connec-
tivity, routing and Internet access. If the cheater node is the
only node in the network providing connection to some nodes
or it is a gateway to the Internet, then its exclusion from the
network may lead to network partition and unavailability of
some services like Internet connection. Even though several
nodes may provide the same service as the cheater node, its
punishment potentially leads to overloading the other nodes if
a load balancing mechanism is not in position.
One of the main challenges related to cheater nodes adver-
tisement in MANETs is the prevention of false alarms that
severely affects the network performance. These false reports
are usually issued from adversary nodes claiming that a given
legitimate sender does not comply with the protocol, which
leads to its exclusion from the network. In what follows, we
describe the functioning of our reaction mechanism and show
how it deals with the aforementioned issue.
Once a deviation of a sender node is observed by its
corresponding receiver, this latter sends a special message,
dubbed Warn-single, which advertises the MAC address of
the cheater node as well as the observed deviation from the
calculated backoff value. The format of this message is shown
on Fig. 2 where the TTL value is set to 4. This value is
deemed to be sufficient to allow all the neighbors of the cheater
node to receive the Warn-single message. Upon reception of
this message, each node starts monitoring all the transmissions
initiated by the advertised node in order to check whether it
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is correctly applying the MAC protocol rules or not. Here, the
dissemination of the sender’s identity is used to warn the sender
that its direct receiver has been aware of its misbehavior, so
it is urged to change that behavior by calculating the backoff
value according to the protocol. If it does so for its subsequent
transmissions, then no punishment will be applied against it,
otherwise all its neighbors will punish it.
The one hop neighbors of the cheater node would be aware
of its misbehavior as follows. The advertiser of the Warn-
single message sets the TTL value to m (m equals 4 in our
simulation) which is decreased at each hop. Upon reception of
this message, if the receiver node is a neighbor of the cheater
node so it discards the message, otherwise it re-broadcasts it
(and decreases the TTL value) except if the TTL reaches 0. To
penalize a confirmed cheater node, each of its neighbors may
refuse to respond to its communication requests (i.e. ignore
its RTS frames) or delay the delivery or forwarding of its
data packets, which leads to severe performance degradation
at the cheater side. Further, those neighbors may also launch a
cross layer punishment scheme by refusing to relay any control
message sent by the cheater node, so it can never be involved
in a routing path.
C. How colluding cheaters are detected?
Sender-receiver collusion is a more sophisticated scenario
of MAC layer misbehavior that most of the current counter-
measures do not cope with it. This misbehavior provokes a
significant reduction of the throughput acquired by the neigh-
bors of the colluding nodes. To defend against this devastating
misbehavior, we propose to extend our detection scheme as
follows. Whenever a node experiences an unusual decrease
of its throughput, it starts supervising all the transmissions
in its vicinity to identify which nodes are getting a higher
throughput. After identifying those nodes, the monitor node
supervises carefully every transmission originated from them
and checks whether they comply with the backoff computation
rules or not. If any node disobeys our proposed scheme
and its intended receiver didn’t inform its neighbors about
this misbehavior, the monitor node then piggybacks both of
their identities in a special message, dubbed Warn-collusion,
along with the corresponding estimated deviation, which is the
difference between the backoff value calculated according to
the Equation (1) and the observed one.
Notice that the receiver identity is also advertised to flag
that it refuses to reveal the identity of a cheating node. To
be able to detect this misbehavior, the monitor node should be
either a neighbor of both the sender and receiver or collaborate
with another node such that each of them is a neighbor of one
of the cheating nodes. A TTL value is also included in the
advertised message (see Fig. 3) and its value is set to 8 in
order to make all the neighbors of both nodes aware of their
misbehavior. These neighbors will then monitor the behavior of
the advertised nodes until either their misbehavior is confirmed
or they have repented and complied again with the protocol.
If their misbehavior is confirmed then the same punishment
scheme (i.e. that described in the previous section) is applied.
III. SIMULATIONS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate the effectiveness of HsF-MAC, we have con-
ducted a set of simulations using OPNET and taking into
TABLE I
SIMULATION SETTINGS
Parameters Values
No. of nodes 5 . . . 150
Physical layer Direct sequence
Transmission range 250 m
Carrier sensing range 550 m
Data rate 3 mbps
Traffic type CBR (500 bytes per packet)
Nodes speed 5m/s
Simulation time 300 seconds
No. of simulation epochs 5
Fig. 4. Detection ratio versus the percentage of the cheater nodes (random
topology).
account various network sizes and topologies. Wireless nodes
are randomly moving, at a speed of 5m/s following random
waypoint mobility model, within the network topology and
exchanging 500 bytes CBR packets. We use MD5 (128bits)
as a hash function to implement HsF-MAC. The setting of the
simulation parameters is summarized in the Table I.
Table II shows the Fairness Index [1] (FI) values measured
on a random topology with varying network size. Both HsF-
MAC and the standard BEB show similar values which are
always close to 1. This proves that using a hash function to
generate the Backoff value ensures fair share of bandwidth
among the contending nodes. The Norm − thr (Normalized
throughput) of each sender node is presented in Table III
from which we can clearly see that the achieved normalized
throughput is much higher in case of small number of senders
(dense network of 5 senders) and decreases to the half when
the number of senders is doubled. This is due to the fact that in
this latter case each node acquires half of the bandwidth gained
in the previous scenario. As the wireless nodes are randomly
distributed in the network then they constitute separated dense
sets of nodes connected among them. Thus, the throughput
acquired in each set doesn’t affect that of the other sets.
So, when the number of senders overtakes 10 the obtained
Norm − thr for each node decreases slightly compared to
the values obtained in the scenario of 10 senders. Notice that
the standard BEB outperforms HsF-MAC in some scenarios
however the gap is usually very small.
Table IV shows that FI of HsF-MAC slightly decreases
as the offered bandwidth increases and the same impact is
observed for the standard BEB. This decrease is justified as
follows: when the offered bandwidth is low (1 and 2 mb/s or
even 5.5 mb/s), the difference between the earned bandwidth
of the nodes is very small and even negligible, however when
the offered bandwidth gets higher, such as 11mb/s or larger,
the gap between the gained bandwidth of the nodes rises and
consequently FI experiences a slight decrease. Additionally,
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Fig. 5. Impact of the MC, network size and topology on false alarms.
TABLE II
IMPACT OF THE NUMBER OF SENDERS ON THE FAIRNESS INDEX IN A
RANDOM TOPOLOGY: STANDARD BEB VS. HSF-MAC
No. of senders 5 10 20 30 40 50
F-Index of BEB 0.987 0.906 0.968 0.96 0.981 0.968
F-Index of 0.986 0.964 0.951 0.957 0.938 0.964
HsF-MAC
we remark that both of the protocols keep always very close
values and in some scenarios, e.g., in case of 2mb/s and 5.5
mb/s, HsF-MAC slightly outperforms the standard BEB.
Fig. 4 shows the variation of the detection ratio of HsF-
MAC in function of the percentage of cheaters in the network
and the applied Misbehavior Coefficient (MC)3. As we can see
from the plotted curves, the detection ratio reaches its highest
values when the number of cheaters is low and the MC is high
(the detection ratio is close to 100 % when the MC is equal
to 0.8 and 1). Then it decreases as the percentage of cheaters
increases, where we observe that the higher the MC is the more
is the reduction of detection ratio. This decrease is justified by
the rise of the collision rate among the cheating nodes and the
interferences that prevent the receiver node from estimating the
correct deviation of the monitored node.
The accuracy of a detection scheme is an important metric
that evaluates its capabilities to distinguish the honest nodes
from the cheaters. As shown in Fig. 5, no false alarm or missed
detection occurred in HsF-MAC (detection accuracy is 100%)
in the case of network characterized by a ring topology for
different values of the MC. This is because of the absence of
interferences that may disrupt the observations taken by the
nodes to compute the backoff values of their neighbors. How-
ever, in the case of random topology the detection accuracy
decreases slightly till it reaches its lowest value which is equal
to 96% in the scenario of 150 nodes and MC equals to 1. We
observe from this figure that the detection accuracy is inversely
proportional to the network size and density. We remark also
that the extent of the misbehavior level doesn’t affect much
the detection accuracy of HsF-MAC since the false alarms and
mis-detected cheaters are mainly caused by the interferences.
Despite the high detection rate of HsF-MAC, it still suffers
from the false accusation of some honest nodes due to false
alarms and miss at detecting some cheaters. To overcome
this drawback, an adequate adjustment of the accuracy factor
(discussed in section II-A) based on the network density,
the interference level and the collision rate in the node’s
neighborhood remains a good solution to alleviate the impact
3The MC is a metric that measures the misbehaving level of a cheater node
(i.e., it defines how much the cheater is deviating from the backoff value that
it should wait for before accessing the medium).
TABLE III
IMPACT OF THE NUMBER OF SENDERS ON THE NORMALIZED THROUGHPUT
(% PER NODE) IN A RANDOM TOPOLOGY: STANDARD BEB VS. HSF-MAC
No. of senders 5 10 20 30 40 50
Norm-thr in BEB 0.109 0.063 0.063 0.062 0.059 0.055
Norm-thr in 0.11 0.064 0.057 0.060 0.056 0.056
HsF-MAC
TABLE IV
IMPACT OF THE VARIATION OF THE OFFERED BANDWIDTH IN THE
NETWORK ON THE FAIRNESS INDEX (RING TOPOLOGY OF 21 NODES)
Offered bandwidth (mb/s) 1 2 5.5 11
F-Index of BEB 0.999 0.976 0.961 0.928
F-Index of HsF-MAC 0.998 0.994 0.979 0.936
of these false alarms and the mis-detected cheaters missed from
HsF-MAC.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have designed a novel backoff scheme to quickly detect
the cheating nodes that do not comply with IEEE 802.11
MAC protocol. The major advantage of HsF-MAC over the
existing solutions is its ability to reveal the identity of the
node that doesn’t choose its backoff properly after one suc-
cessful transmission of an RTS frame. Therefore, the impact
of the cheater node on the bandwidth fair-share is counteracted
efficiently. Moreover, HsF-MAC is resistant to sender-receiver
collusion. The simulation results show that the gain of this
solution is twofold, it ensures fair share of bandwidth among
nearby nodes, as shown in Tables II and IV, and achieves
high detection rate and low false positive rate, under moderate
percentage of cheating nodes.
In addition, a reaction scheme is proposed to penalize the
detected cheaters. Unlike the traditional punishment schemes,
our reaction mechanism encourages the cheaters to become
honest rather than punishing them. This is achieved through
the warning message disseminated by the detector node, which
constitutes double notification. It warns the cheater node
regarding its misbehavior and discloses its identity to its
neighbors. So, the cheater node will either stop its misbehavior
to avoid punishment or keep it until being punished by the
neighbors.
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